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scholars from mainland China (including Jiang herself) under a sepa-
rate/secondary group is rather dubitable, if not impertinent. Does this
method of division suggest thatworks bymainland Chinese scholars do
not belong properly or are secondary to the major schools of works in
the English world? It is even more puzzling to note that scholars from
Taiwan andHongKong, in contrast, are included in the primary group.
I find it really hard to understand why such kind of “racial profiling”
should be adopted for introducing academic discourses that are meant
to promote the spirit of free and fair exchanges of ideas between differ-
ent cultural traditions.
Despite this questionable method of organization, the quality of the
edition and translation is praiseworthy in general, especially consider-
ing the good number of translators who have to work on a total of
twenty-six articles. The only notable weakness of the book, ironically,
is the notes on the original English works. One may suppose this
should be the easiest part as it involves only the task of mechanical
replication. However, precisely here one finds numerous infelicities
and even egregious mistakes such as missing page numbers (p. 141,
332), incorrect journal title (p. 515), erroneous web source information
(p. 215), and misspelled editor’s name (p. 195). It appears that the
proper handling of English sources and styles remains a formidable
task for some Chinese copyeditors.
As my concluding remark, let me put forward a modest suggestion
for the compilation of such collective translation ofWestern philosoph-
ical articles, whose number has been encouragingly growing in the past
few years. Inmy view, it is advisable to include at least some brief intro-
duction of the academic and biographical backgrounds of the transla-
tors, instead of just listing their names at some marginal places. For the
fine collection of essays in this volume would not have been possible
without the translators’ strenuous and substantial labor. After all, it
makes good sense to honor and applaud thework of translation, whose
importance for cross-cultural dialogues can never be overestimated.
Huaiyu Wang
Georgia College & State University, Milledgeville, Georgia
Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy. Edited by
Stephen R. Palmquist. (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2010.
845 Pp. Hardback. ISBN 9783110226232.)
Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy succeeds in spite
of, and not because of, its formidable length. The volume is divided
into three Books, including three extended Keynote essays, an
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introduction, and an epilogue. The overarching structure is fairly
obvious: the first Book seeks mainly to scrutinize and develop the
topic of personhood as it appears in Kant’s three famous critical
works; the second aims chiefly to situate Kant’s critical views on per-
sonhood in broader cultural and political domains; the third primarily
provides comparisons between Kant’s notions of personhood and
those developed in Asia, as well as investigations into the difficult his-
torical and conceptual relationships between Kant and Asia. As such,
it is especially and almost entirely in the third Book that the volume
manages to largely fulfill the promise announced in the book’s title,
“East-West Perspectives on Cultivating Personhood,” and it is thus to
this part of the volume that I now turn.
Part XII of Book Three, “Kant on Asia and Asia in Kant,” includes
Peter K. J. Park’s deliciously polemical “The Exclusion of Asia and
Africa from the History of Philosophy: Is Kant Responsible?,” which
labors to establish that “Kant [was central in producing] a distinctly
modern science of race. Kant is as responsible as [Christoph] Meiners
for the exclusion of Asia and Africa from the history of philosophy
and for the rise of Eurocentrism in the modern discipline of philoso-
phy.” (p. 790) Park attempts to establish close links between Kant’s
philosophy of the history of philosophy and his conceptions of race,
with a series of Kant-inflected histories of philosophy written by,
among others, Gottleib Buhle, Wilhelm Tennemann, Deterich Tiede-
mann, and above all, Christoph Meiners. Kant himself does not go
unexamined, as Park emphasizes Kant’s remarks such as: “‘[A]ll Ori-
ental peoples are not in the position to establish through concepts a
single property of morality or law’.” (p. 789).
This claim by Kant is remarkable when juxtaposed with Klaus-
Gerd Giesen’s essay, which argues carefully that “the abuse of Asian
hospitality in East India and Formosa by the British, French, and
Dutch…led Kant subtly to distinguish between the three rights to hos-
pitality (asylum, visits, trade) and intolerable colonial behavior. The
latter must be strongly condemned on the ground of cosmopolitan
law. Furthermore, in Kant’s view, colonialism is such a strong abuse of
cosmopolitan hospitality that he felt obliged to add in the third Defini-
tive Article of Perpetual Peace: ‘… the narrower or wider community
of the peoples of the earth has developed so far that a violation of
rights in one place is felt throughout the world’ ” (Giesen’s emphasis).
(p. 762) This sort of dissociative identity to be found in Kant is espe-
cially important because in this regard Kant is, in many ways, repre-
sentative of European philosophy of the early modern period.
Moreover, the troubled tension between cosmopolitan international-
ist and folkish racialist sensibilities he exhibits remains a serious chal-
lenge for both scholars and lay people across the globe.
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Part IX focuses on the work of Mou Zongsan, with authors vari-
ously interpreting, extending, correcting, and criticizing a number of
his positions on Kant as well as neo-Confucianism (and, in the case of
Annie Boisclair’s contribution, even the Buddhist teaching). Parts
X and XI contain a host of fascinating comparative efforts that exam-
ine, among other topics, Kantian good will and Confucian sincere will
(A. T. Nuyen), Kant and Xunzi on the Inclinations (Scott R. Stroud),
and self-knowledge in Kant and the Buddha (Emer O’hagan). While
the core of the essays with an Asian emphasis are to be found in Book
Three, there are a handful of essays in Books One and Two that
include discussions that either directly or indirectly involve Asia and
Asian philosophy. Eric Nelson attempts to steer between “anthropo-
centric humanism, with all of its questionable assumptions about ‘the
human’ as distinct from animals and the natural world, and an imperso-
nal naturalism that seems to depersonalize and de-individuate the per-
son” (p. 333) by playing Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of
Judgment) off of Zhuangzi (both the person and the work). Christian
Wenzel explores convergences and divergences between aesthetics and
morality in Kant in Confucius, ultimately employing the Kantian notion
of purposiveness to help explicate tian and dao, along with the closely
related conceptual pair of li and ren. Bernhard Jakl provides an interest-
ing and helpful discussion of the relationship between Kant’s notion of
human dignity and the contemporary German constitutional court’s
interpretation of that notion, particularly with regard to the Aviation
Security Act (Luftsicherheitsgesetz) and its implications for interna-
tional relations.
However, the lion’s share of the material in Books One and Two
is dedicated to specific topics of personhood in Kant’s works; some
defend established positions in the literature, while others venture
further afield. Chong-Fuk Lau argues that Kant’s treatments of self-
cognition in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason)
should not be understood as “descriptions about the structure and
operations of the human mind,” but rather as “a conceptual analysis
of the structure of cognition of the finite rational being as such”
(p. 100), while Andrew Brook investigates the place and significance
of transcendental reflection (U¨berlegung) in the development of
Kant’s thought. Wolfgang Ertl offers an analysis of the compatibility
between “causal closure and the non-naturalness of reason” (p.
217), while Ulrich Seeberg argues that since “the unity of human
personhood is based upon the unity or reason” (p. 287), we ought to
look toward aesthetic judgment to find the grounds of such unity.
Bart Vandenabeele likewise suggests that aesthetic judgments are
central to personhood for Kant because they ultimately “[join]
together the most personal contingent feelings of pleasure (or
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displeasure) with a necessary, universal, and cosmopolitan idea of
humanity” (p. 309), while Gu¨nter Zo¨ller looks at the relationship
between Kant’s appropriation of certain conceptions from the politi-
cal domain for use in his ethics and psychology. Connecting with a
contemporary concern, Ronal Green and Natascha Gruber discuss
Kantian perspectives on stem cell research, with Gruber arguing
particularly “against those who claim that Kant’s ethics is compati-
ble with hESC research.” (p. 361) These are just a small sample of
the essays on offer, as the total number, not including the three
lengthier keynotes, is sixty-four.
Interestingly, the keynote essays reverse the proportional focus of
the volume as a whole, as Patricia Kitcher’s essay is the only one that
focuses solely on Kant. She discusses “the spontaneity of thought and
action” (p. 36), ultimately arguing that “we lose what is most persua-
sive in Kant’s cognitive theory and in his moral theory by closely align-
ing the two.” (p. 37) Gu¨nter Wohlfart, in barbed but loose and often
entertaining prose, contends that “for Kant, devoted only to cold
abstract duty, the warm feeling of compassion is weak and always
blind” and thus it needs tempering by the likes of Kongzi, Mengzi,
Huainanzi, and Zhuangzi. Chung-ying Cheng’s contribution works
toward “a Confucian-Kantian synthesis” whereby Confucian ren can
be understood as both a kind of perfect virtue as well as a perfect duty
of virtue (p. 89).
The fact that the main portion of the volume reverses the orienta-
tion of the keynote essays brings us to some of the problems with the
text. First and foremost, given the purported titular topic, too much of
the work focuses tightly on relatively narrow interpretive issues cen-
tering entirely on Kant, with the result that the vast majority of the
first two-thirds of the text pay no significant attention to Asian philos-
ophy or Asia more broadly. Second, it is simultaneously too long and
too short: many times I found myself just getting fully immersed in an
essay only to have it end rather abruptly, with the author occasionally
citing length limitations, while at other times I felt as if material was
being essentially duplicated. In other words, this text would have ben-
efited from a slightly different editorial approach: the total number of
essays should have been significantly lower, while the length limit of
each should have been significantly higher. A similar shift in emphasis
would have helped address the imbalance in focus noted above. Third,
the essays vary in terms of quality: some are fully worked out and ele-
gantly argued, while others seem to be early and somewhat sketchy
forays. As the text comes out of a conference, this is to some extent
understandable, but given the other problems, it would have benefited
from further editing.
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All that said, Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy
should find a happy home in libraries, bookshelves of scholars, and
homes of interested lay readers. On balance, its positives outweigh its
negatives, and it will hopefully contribute to correcting some of the
imbalance in scholarship evident in its own pages.
Aderemi Artis
University of Michigan, Flint, Michigan
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